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AVOIDING MAZIBUKO: WATER SECURITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN CASE LAW 
  Ed Couzens 
1 Introduction: The judgment in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 
ometimes a judgment is given which is so significant that it attracts attention not just 
in its region but worldwide also. The judgment becomes one which is discussed, or at 
least mentioned, in every account of its field. The judgment by the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg1 appears to have been one such 
in the field of environmental law. South African water law experienced an "apotheosis" 
in the late 1990s when, with the promulgation of the National Water Act,2 private 
ownership of water ceased to be permissible; riparian rights ceased to exist; and two 
users – human beings, for a daily needs component, and the environment itself – 
became the only "priority users".3 This appeared to signal a "sea change" in the state's 
attitude toward freshwater usage and the rights of people4 – but the optimism of 
commentators concerned with environmental protection and human rights that 
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Associate Professor, University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, Australia; Attorney of the High 
Court, RSA. E-mail: ed.couzens@sydney.edu.au. Thanks are due to both Meda Couzens and Victor 
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1  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) (Mazibuko). 
2  National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
3  National Water Act 36 of 1998, Part 3: The Reserve. 
4  Stewart and Horsten argue that "South Africa is one of the few jurisdictions in the world that 
provides for an explicit right to water" with s 27(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 "guarantee[ing] the right to access to adequate water". Stewart and Horsten 2009 
SAPR/PL 488. The full right in the Constitution reads:  
27. Health care, food, water and social security 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to— 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
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traditional heavy users5 would now be protected less than would people and the 
environment itself6 may need to be tempered after the Mazibuko judgment. 
As the judgment has been analysed in depth by numerous writers,7 its facts will be 
discussed here only briefly. The point of this article is in fact not to analyse the 
Mazibuko judgment itself, or at least not directly, but to consider the implications in 
relation to the judgment of two subsequent judgments relevant to water security-
related issues in Southern Africa.8 Despite the Constitutional Court's conservative 
ruling on payment for water services in Mazibuko, questions related to access to water 
will continue to arise and disconnections to be challenged. While a direct challenge to 
the Mazibuko ruling is unlikely in the short term, there may be ways for courts to avoid 
the decision and find in favour of dispossessed applicants. 
The applicants in the Mazibuko case were residents in one of the poorest areas in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. The city authorities had decided to supply six kilolitres of 
water per month free to every account holder in the city. The applicants challenged 
the constitutionality of this decision on the ground that the Constitution9 provides that 
everyone has the right of access to sufficient water.10 The applicants argued further 
that it was unlawful for the city to install prepaid water meters in certain households. 
At issue, therefore, were the obligations which rest on the city as an organ of state. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the right of access to sufficient water does not 
require that the state provide every person, upon demand and without more, with 
sufficient water. Nor does the obligation confer on any person a right to claim 
                                        
5  Agriculture, industry and mining. 
6  According to one commentator, "water experts around the world are, not surprisingly, watching 
South Africa's new water law and process of water reform unfold", quoting former Minister of 
Water Affairs Buyelwa Sonjica as saying in 2005 that the Department's "water allocation reform" 
framework "reflects our efforts to ensure that in managing the water in Africa and beyond, we 
adopt approaches that aim to achieve broader goals of fairness and equity, poverty eradication 
and sustainability". Posthumus 2005 SA Irrigation 8. 
7  See, for instance, Stewart and Horsten 2009 SAPR/PL; and the various writers cited in s 2 of the 
text above. 
8  City of Cape Town v Marcel Mouzakis Strümpher 2012 ZASCA 54 (30 March 2012); and Farai 
Mushoriwa v City of Harare 2014 ZWHHC 195 (5 June, 23 July and 2 August 2013, and 30 April 
2014) - see Parts 3 and 4 below. 
9  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
10  Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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"sufficient water" from the state immediately.11 The constitutional right requires 
instead that the state take reasonable legislative and other measures, progressively 
and within the state's available resources, to realise the achievement of the right of 
access to sufficient water.12 
According to the Constitutional Court, the state's obligations can be enforced through 
the courts by requiring the state to take those steps that are required in order to meet 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness. A measure would be considered 
unreasonable if it made no provision for those persons who are in desperate need. If 
the state were to adopt policies which had unreasonable limitations or exclusions, then 
a court could order that such limitations or exclusions be removed. Further, it was 
held that the obligation of progressive realisation imposed a duty upon the state to 
review its policies continually to ensure that the achievement of the right is realised 
progressively.13 The Constitutional Court then held, further, that an obligation rests 
on the state to set out clearly the targets which it hopes to achieve.14 
The Constitutional Court held, in the light of the evidence presented, that it could not 
be said that the provision of six kilolitres of free water per household per month was 
unreasonable.15 The applicants failed also for various reasons to establish that the 
introduction of prepaid water meters was unlawful.16 
The Constitutional Court held generally that local government is recognised as one of 
the three spheres of government in the South African constitutional order. A municipal 
council is considered a deliberative body that exercises both legislative and executive 
functions and where such a council takes a decision in pursuance of its legislative and 
executive functions, that decision will not ordinarily be one that is of administrative 
nature.17 According to the Constitutional Court, when the state is challenged judicially 
as to its socio-economic policies, then the agency in question must explain why the 
                                        
11  Mazibuko para [57]. 
12  Mazibuko para [50]. 
13  Mazibuko para [67]. 
14  Mazibuko para [70]. 
15  Mazibuko paras [82]-[89]. 
16  Mazibuko paras [105]-[157]. 
17  Mazibuko para [130]. 
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policy is reasonable; and must disclose what it did (including its investigation and 
research) to formulate the policy, what alternatives were considered, and the reasons 
why the option underlying the policy was selected. The state may be challenged 
judicially to account for its decisions, and must then show that the policy selected is 
reasonable and that it is being reconsidered in the light of its obligation progressively 
to realise the relevant socio-economic rights.18 
2 Reactions to the judgment in Mazibuko 
Reactions to the judgment have generally not been positive, to say the least. Kidd has 
called it a "deeply flawed judgment", pointing out that residents in the area relevant 
to the case were "among the poorest of the poor, and many were also suffering from 
HIV/Aids" – and "inability to pay the 'top-up' amount [of a prepaid meter] would mean 
that many people would spend a considerable part of every month with no (not limited, 
but absolutely no) water".19 
Women, suggest Dugard and Mohlakoana, "bear the brunt of water []-related 
problems".20 They note that merely having "greater physical access to water (through 
bringing water infrastructure closer to people's households) is meaningless if water 
remains unaffordable"21 and that, quoting the 1997 White Paper on Water Services, 
"[i]n the context of the reform of water law, the right to equality requires equitable 
access by all South African to, and benefit from[,] the nation's water resources, and 
an end to discrimination with regard to access to water on the basis of race, class or 
gender".22 They then explain that "the reality on the ground is that many poor South 
African still struggle to access water and electricity services" with such access being 
"largely a function of availability, affordability and amount".23 Poor African women, 
they add, "are disproportionately affected by [] water and electricity services-related 
issues and continue to suffer diminished access", with this compromising their "ability 
                                        
18  Mazibuko paras [161]-[161]. 
19  Kidd Environmental Law 92. 
20  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 546-548.  
21  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 550. 
22  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 558-559. 
23  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 561.  
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to enjoy life and to advance socio-economically".24 They then argue that women are 
typically the "most adversely affected by prepayment water meter-related problems" 
in terms of having to find the wherewithal to pay for them, and to deal with the 
consequences of disconnection – it is mainly women, they say, "who have to make 
difficult choices between going for days without water and conserving water in ways 
that compromise health or dignity".25 
Naidoo, Thamaga-Chitja and Shimelis agree, writing that in disadvantaged 
communities women are an especially "marginalized group and often disconnected 
and alienated from water [and other] systems that might develop prosperous local 
food systems and sustainable livelihoods".26 Their article, which focuses on 
disadvantaged rural communities, is a useful reminder that it is not just in urban 
settings (such as were contended over in Mazibuko) that constrained access to water 
is a problem – in rural settings there might even be additional problems, such as 
seasonal unavailability of water and greater gender disparities.27 
Dugard and Mohlakoana conclude that basic services in South Africa "exist within a 
commendably rights-oriented framework" which "explicitly recognises historic 
disadvantage, including gender, and seeks to remedy this through advancing 
substantive equality".28 However, they say, "on the ground at local government level 
the reality is far more complex, with low-income households facing multiple obstacles 
in accessing water and electricity services" – with these problems arising "because of 
a [] generalised exclusionary paradigm in which there is insufficient attention [given] 
to the needs of the poor".29 
Kemerink, Ahlers and van der Zwaag, writing generally rather than particularly about 
Mazibuko, contend that the National Water Act "is implemented and enforced in a 
society thick with historically-entrenched socio-economic and political inequities" and 
that a decade after its introduction "access to water is still highly stratified along racial 
                                        
24  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 561. 
25  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 564-565. 
26  Naidoo, Thamaga-Chitja and Shimelis 2013 Indilinga 302. 
27  Naidoo, Thamaga-Chitja and Shimelis 2013 Indilinga 306-307 and generally. 
28  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 572. 
29  Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 572. 
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lines".30 The dynamics, they say, "of water politics, including water law and rights, 
cannot be understood without also scrutinising the power relations, discourses and 
discursive practices that guide perceptions of water problems and proposed 
solutions".31 They then argue that while the National Water Act is "comprehensive in 
its legislation and provides powerful legal tools to address poverty eradication and 
redress inequities inherited from the past", there has been "in reality little [achieved 
by way of] transition in the access to and control over water resources".32 
Van Koppen avers that "over 95% of [South Africa's] water resources are controlled 
by only 0.5% of the population",33 and that although post-1994 the water economy 
has become less White-dominated, "in terms of both clients and water 
professionals",34 the beneficiaries of changes have "largely remained those who 
already benefited in the past and to a lesser extent the upcoming Black middle-
class".35 The "White water economy", she says, "has definitely opened up, but is hardly 
democratised as yet".36 
Bond traces the history of the "commercialisation" of water in recent South Africa, 
describing commercialisation as being "viewed with great enthusiasm by the new 
South African government".37 He explains that the process has been accompanied by 
various forms of protest, "including informal/illegal reconnections to official water 
supplies" and the "destruction of prepayment meters".38 According to Bond, at one 
stage in early 2002 municipal officials in Johannesburg were disconnecting some 
20 000 households per month from power and water in conditions that are 
"particularly hostile to vulnerable people". The prepayment system was inefficient, 
                                        
30  Kemerink, Ahlers and Van der Zwaag 2011 Water SA 585. 
31  Kemerink, Ahlers and Van der Zwaag 2011 Water SA 586. 
32  Kemerink, Ahlers and Van der Zwaag 2011 Water SA 592. 
33  Van Koppen 2008 Water SA 432. 
34  Van Koppen 2008 Water SA 435. 
35  Van Koppen 2008 Water SA 436. 
36  Van Koppen 2008 Water SA 436. 
37  Bond 2013 SAJHR 129. Van Koppen supports this, arguing that historically in South Africa water 
has increasingly been seen as "an economic good", and that in the 1970s and 1980s the "urgency 
to implement the 'user pays' principle became stronger with reducing state funding when apartheid 
South Africa was confronted by economic stagflation, international boycotts and high state 
spending on the police and military to suppress the immense political protest within and outside 
South Africa". Van Koppen 2008 Water SA 434.  
38  Bond 2013 SAJHR 129. 
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disconnections happened without warning, and the plaintiffs in Mazibuko argued that 
the system represented a safety hazard in the event of fire.39 Bond argues, however, 
that the residents erred in arguing their case with a focus "only upon the consumption 
needs of low-income residents" and without looking at a wider societal and 
environmental context. We need "as a first step", he concludes, "more coherent 
critiques of the full range of practices that undermine our ability to perceive and 
respect water and other aspects of nature as a commons".40 
Other commentators have pointed, at least impliedly, to the Mazibuko case as having 
seen missed opportunities. Dugard and Alcaro describe the right to water for human 
domestic consumption as "increasingly being contested in relation to water resource 
conservation",41 but point out that "the only water rights case to have come before 
the Constitutional Court, Mazibuko, did not include environmental rights arguments 
even though it involved the 'environmental' issues of the domestic use of water by 
multi-dwelling poor households with waterborne sanitation".42 
Problems related to access to water can be expected to increase in the future. South 
Africa is already, according to its own Department of Water Affairs, already the 30th 
"driest" country in the world,43 and the volatility of weather patterns which is likely to 
accompany changing climatic conditions is likely to have a severely negative effect on 
the lives of the poor. As Dugard, Lera St Clair and Gloppen point out,44 it is "clear that 
the groups that will suffer the most from the challenges posed by climate change are 
those that are already suffering the negative impacts of other global challenges",45 or 
those who have no "voice or power",46 or those with "poor or no access to health, 
                                        
39  Bond 2013 SAJHR 131-132. One of the applicants in Mazibuko gave evidence that two small 
children had died in a shack fire with neither he nor his neighbours having sufficient credit to 
access water to combat the fire. Dugard and Maohlakoana 2009 SAJHR 565. 
40  Bond 2013 SAJHR 141-143. 
41  Dugard and Alcaro 2013 SAJHR 15. 
42  Dugard and Alcaro 2013 SAJHR 31. 
43  Department of Water Affairs 2013/2014 http://www.doc.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/ 
docs/resourcecentre/yearbook/2013-4Water_Affairs.pdf. 
44  Dugard, Lera St Clair and Gloppen 2013 SAJHR 7. 
45  Such as "financial/economic crises, ongoing conflicts, environmental degradation and loss of 
biodiversity". Dugard, Lera St Clair and Gloppen 2013 SAJHR 7. 
46  Or who have no "assets or access to energy" and who are "lacking insurance for flooding or for 
destruction caused by severe weather events". Dugard, Lera St Clair and Gloppen 2013 SAJHR 7. 
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education, clean water and under conditions of food and labour insecurity",47 among 
other factors. 
Roithmayr argues, on the basis of Mazibuko, that the Constitutional Court has 
"embraced a neoliberal interest in cost recovery from the poor, and has declared cost 
recovery program[me]s constitutional even when they infringe on socio-economic 
rights".48 According to Roithmayr, in Mazibuko the Court arguably rejected "the idea 
that affirmative socio-economic rights created some minimum core of obligation that 
government owed citizens, and emphasised the need to defer to government decision 
making in assessing the rights of access for those who could not afford water".49 She 
then adds that the Court "found it constitutional to ration access to water based on 
the ability to pay, even for the country's poorest black residents"; and that, in doing 
so, the Court "took as its implicit baseline of reasonability [] apartheid inequalities of 
race and class [--] that target the poor", in effect finding "these inequalities 
constitutionally permissible, even though cost recovery from the poor serves to 
reinforce the legacy of apartheid".50 Roithmayr concludes from this that it might be 
possible to criticise the Court for "embracing [--] cost recovery programmes that 
condition full and adequate access to water for the poor on the ability to pay", with 
"[a]ggressive cost recovery from the country's poorest [] always be[ing] antithetical 
to the task of dismantling persistent race and class inequality".51 As with other 
commentators, she laments a missed opportunity, arguing that "[a]gainst the 
backdrop of apartheid's stratification of race and class, the Court could have ruled that 
the city should refrain from aggressive cost recovery targeted towards the country's 
poorest via pre-paid meters".52 
Writing less formally, but making the accusation of the Court's "endors[ing]" a "neo-
liberal paradigm of water provision" which Roithmayr subsequently makes, De Vos 
calls the judgment "carefully argued (but to my mind utterly unconvincing)" and 
                                        
47  Dugard, Lera St Clair and Gloppen 2013 SAJHR 7. 
48  Roithmayr 2010 CCR 317 and generally. 
49  Roithmayr 2010 CCR 323. 
50  Roithmayr 2010 CCR 324. 
51  Roithmayr 2010 CCR 325-326. 
52  Roithmayr 2010 CCR 325-326. 
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described it as seemingly "based on an assumption that people do not pay for water 
because they are bad or dishonest people" who "want something for free when they 
need to (and can) pay for the water" – with the judgment "fail[ing] to take account of 
the fact that even if we all wanted to be good little capitalists like the government 
wants us to be, we cannot all afford the basic necessities that would sustain our 
lives".53 De Vos concludes that it was "previously" the Supreme Court of Appeal which 
"used to hand down conservative judgments which were then overturned on appeal 
to the Constitutional Court", but that the "latter [C]ourt" is becoming more 
conservative and it might eventually be the SCA which "emerge[s] as the [C]ourt 
championing the rights of the marginalised and downtrodden".54 
There have not been many judgments of South Africa's Constitutional Court which 
have attracted such near-universal condemnation. 
3 Further judgments: City of Cape Town v Strümpher 
The case of City of Cape Town v Strümpher,55 a judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA), per Mthiyane DP, concerned the cutting off by the appellant City of the 
respondent's access to water for alleged non-payment. The respondent had alleged 
successfully in a Magistrates' Court that he had been unlawfully dispossessed of his 
lawful access to water; and had then been successful again on appeal to a full bench 
of the Cape High Court. The City had now appealed to the SCA. The respondent had 
alleged that disconnecting his water supply had constituted interference with his 
statutory water rights in terms of the Water Services Act56 and had therefore 
constituted spoliation.57 His argument was that his water supply could not be lawfully 
                                        
53  De Vos 2009 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/water-is-life-but-life-is-cheap/. 
54  De Vos 2009 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/water-is-life-but-life-is-cheap/. 
55  City of Cape Town v Marcel Mouzakis Strümpher 2012 ZASCA 54 (30 March 2012) (Strümpher). 
56  Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
57  Meaning an unlawful dispossession of property of which he had been in peaceful possession. It 
needs to be noted that in South African law the remedy of the mandament van spolie, which 
requires immediate restoration of possession, is available to the applicant who has been 
dispossessed unlawfully of property of which he had been in peaceful possession. Granting of the 
remedy does not include an enquiry into which party possesses any greater rights – such an 
enquiry is in fact irrelevant and precluded. The remedy is intended to be a response to persons 
"taking the law into their own hands", and (subject to certain qualifications, such as the property 
having been destroyed after the dispossession) operates by way of immediate restoration of the 
status quo ante. 
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disconnected for non-payment unless the amount by which he was in arrears had 
been determined judicially in favour of the City.58 In response, the City argued that 
summary disconnection of the water supply was authorised by the City's water by-law 
and by its debt collection by-law. The City contended that it supplied water to the 
respondent in terms of a supply contract between them; and that, on the authority of 
an SCA decision (Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd),59 the remedy of mandament van 
spolie was not available to the respondent.60 
The respondent was the operator of a caravan park for permanent residents, which 
park had been supplied by the City with water for some 37 years up to 2007. In that 
year the City demanded that alleged arrears of R182 000.00 for water usage be paid 
within two days, failing which the water supply would be disconnected. There had 
been a long-running dispute over the amount, with some evidence available that the 
equipment which the City had used to measure the respondent's water usage was 
defective.61 Without responding to a letter from the respondent's attorneys, dated 28 
May 2007, the City disconnected the water supply on 17 August 2007. The City, in its 
answering affidavit, contended that the mere existence of a dispute did not assist the 
respondent for various reasons – including that the monthly statements which the City 
furnished to the respondent stipulated that payments may not be withheld even where 
there is a dispute. The spoliation order granted by the magistrate was, however, 
upheld by the CPD (full bench) – but leave to appeal to the SCA was granted.62 
The primary issue on appeal, according to the SCA, was whether the City was entitled 
to disconnect the water supply due to non-payment of arrears, despite the dispute 
over liability, with the City justifying the summary disconnection on the basis, firstly, 
that the respondent's right to the water supply was simply a personal right founded 
on a contract; and, secondly, that the City's actions were authorised by its water by-
law and debt collection by-law.63 The City argued that the relationship between the 
                                        
58  Strümpher para [1]. 
59  Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd 2003 5 SA 309 (SCA). In the Telkom decision it was found that 
possession of bandwidth could not be restored using a mandament van spolie. 
60  Strümpher para [1]. 
61  Strümpher paras [2]-[3]. 
62  Strümpher paras [4]-[5]. 
63  Strümpher para [6]. 
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parties was a contractual one; and that, in terms of the Water Services Act,64 the duty 
of the water service authority to provide water service is subject to an obligation on 
the water user to pay reasonable charges. Further, that compelling the City to supply 
the respondent with water would amount to nothing more than enforcing contractual 
rights under an agreement which could not provide a basis for granting a spoliation 
order.65 The SCA found this argument to be "misplaced" and that the fact that a 
contract must be concluded by a consumer living in a municipal area does not relegate 
the consumer's right to water to a "mere personal right flowing from that contractual 
relationship". The City remains with a constitutional and statutory obligation66 to 
supply water to users, such as the respondent user in this case. The right to water, 
the SCA iterated, is a basic constitutional right.67 This being the case, the right to 
water which the respondent claimed when applying for the spoliation order was not 
based solely on his contract with the City, but was underpinned by his constitutional 
and statutory rights. This is important. Although dealing with a common law remedy, 
the SCA brought in considerations other than the traditional assessment of whether 
or not there had been an unlawful dispossession, with "merits" and considerations of 
"equity" being traditionally irrelevant. 
The SCA then stated that this view was "fortified" by the SCA decision in Impala Water 
Users Association v Lourens,68 in which a water user had obtained a spoliation order, 
and where the SCA had held that the Telkom case was distinguishable and personal 
rights flowing from the water user's contract of water supply were not merely 
contractual rights but had been "replaced or subsumed into rights under the National 
Water Act". The SCA in Impala therefore held that the rights to water in that case 
were "capable of protection by the mandament van spolie".69 
                                        
64  Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
65  Strümpher paras [7-[8]. 
66  The SCA referred to s 27(1) of the Constitution; given effect to in s 3(1) of the Water Services Act 
108 of 1997. 
67  Strümpher para [9].  
68  Impala Water Users Association v Lourens 2008 2 SA 495 (SCA) (Impala). 
69  Impala para [10]. The SCA in Impala distinguished the Telkom case also on the basis that the use 
of bandwidth "did not constitute an incident of its use of the premises", whereas the water rights 
which were in issue were linked to and registered and the "use of the water was accordingly an 
incident of possession". Impala para [19]. 
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The SCA then compared the respondent in Strümpher to the water users in Impala, 
saying that water users have a statutory right to the supply of water in terms of the 
Water Services Act, which imposes a duty on a water services authority to "ensure 
access to water services to consumers", with it following that the respondent's right 
to a water supply could not be classified as purely contractual. Instead, his right to a 
water supply was subsumed into rights under the Water Services Act and could not 
therefore be described as merely personal rights arising from a contract.70 
On the issue of whether the City was authorised by the Water Services Act or by 
relevant water- or debt collection-related by-laws, the SCA held that the City (which 
"considered that immediate disconnection of the water supply to the respondent's 
property was authorised") said that "[i]n my view, the City appears to have overlooked 
the provisions71 of the Water Services Act, requiring that 'the limitation or 
discontinuation of water services must be fair and equitable'".72 The SCA was 
somewhat contemptuous of the City's attitude, referring to it as being "armed" with 
an "arsenal of statutory provisions" in reaching its conclusion that it could proceed to 
immediate disconnection.73 In the Court's view, however, "[t]o expect the respondent 
to pay R182 000.00 while he is disputing the very amount erodes the principles of 
fairness contemplated in" the Water Services Act and the dispute resolution 
procedures;74 and rejected as "flimsy" the City's "excuse", proffered during argument, 
for not having followed its own prescribed procedures.75 
The City attempted also to rely on another SCA case, Rademan v Moqhaka 
Municipality,76 to justify immediate disconnection. The SCA found this reliance 
"misplaced" because the case had dealt not with water supply but with the 
discontinuation of electricity supply to defaulters; and because there had been in that 
                                        
70  Strümpher para [11]. 
71  Section 4(3)(a) of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
72  Strümpher para [14]. In the SCA's view the City had also "overlooked" its own dispute resolution 
provisions, as provided in its own Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy – including time limits 
and provision for appeal. 
73  Strümpher para [14]. 
74  Strümpher para [15]. 
75  Strümpher para [16]. 
76  Rademan v Moqhaka Municipality 2012 2 SA 387 (SCA). 
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case a deliberate withholding of payment by "unhappy" defaulters.77 The SCA 
concluded that there was no justification for the City to have cut off the respondent's 
water supply.78 
Finally, the SCA considered whether the mandament van spolie was an appropriate 
remedy, concluding that it was, on the basis, inter alia, that "[t]he respondent's use 
of water was an incident of possession of the property" and that "[c]learly interference 
by the City with the respondent's access to the water supply was akin to deprivation 
of possession of property".79 
The SCA did not in the Strümpher judgment mention the Mazibuko judgment, deciding 
the matter instead on the basis solely of the principles of spoliation. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to consider – in the light of the Mazibuko judgment – the pains which 
the SCA took to find that water supply stood on a different basis to either bandwidth 
or electricity. The SCA referred several times to the constitutional nature of the right 
to access to water; and to the fact that rights of a contractual nature had been 
"subsumed" by water-related statutes – and then found in favour of the restoration of 
access to water. Arguably, the effect of the decision is that a Constitutional Court 
decision is circumvented by recourse to the common law – as influenced by 
constitutional principles! 
4 Further judgments: Mushoriwa v City of Harare  
The writing of the present article was provoked partly by a recent judgment of the 
High Court of Zimbabwe, Harare,80 a judgment of Bhunu J. The matter was an urgent 
application for a spoliation order, coupled with an interdict – the relief sought was a 
final order to the effect that termination by the respondent City of the applicant's 
water supply on the basis of a disputed water bill and in the absence of a court order 
constituted "unlawful self-help"; and that the respondent be interdicted from 
interfering with, disrupting or terminating the applicant's water supply without a court 
                                        
77  Strümpher para [17]. 
78  Strümpher para [18]. 
79  Strümpher para [19]. 
80  Farai Mushoriwa v City of Harare 2014 ZWHHC 195 (5 June, 23 July and 2 August 2013, and 30 
April 2014) (Mushoriwa). 
E COUZENS    PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
1175 
order. In the interim, the applicant sought an order directing the City to reconnect his 
water supply, and barring the respondent from interfering with or terminating the 
water supply at his premises.81 
The applicant was a lawful tenant and occupier of premises in the City of Harare, the 
respondent municipality of which was the sole supplier of water.82 In May 2013 the 
City sent the applicant a bill for US$ 1 700.00 in respect of "payment for water services 
rendered". The applicant disputed owing that, or any other, amount – he claimed that 
he had always paid his bills on time, attached proof to that effect, and argued that 
the bill was relevant to a bulk meter external to the premises. On 31 May 2013, 
however, the City "unilaterally and arbitrarily" disconnected the applicant's water 
supply. He then brought an urgent application for a spoliation order.83 The judge 
hearing that application was Bhunu J himself. In his words, "[h]aving regard to the 
urgency of the case when seized with the matter I immediately ordered by consent of 
the parties restoration of the water services forthwith pending the determination of 
this application to avert a catastrophe as one cannot survive without water". The Court 
noted that the respondent "duly complied thereby ameliorating the urgency of the 
matter".84 It is unclear what the Court meant by "duly complied", unless perhaps an 
undertaking was given to comply, as the Court then goes on to say that "[d]espite the 
existence of a lawful court order barring the respondent from disconnecting water 
services from the applicant's premises until the finalisation of this application, the 
respondent still went ahead and defiantly disconnected water services from the 
applicant's premises with impunity without any Court order or legal justification". The 
City refused also to reconnect the water supplies despite the applicant pointing out 
that it was in contempt of court. The Court had to intervene again and to threaten 
officials with imprisonment before the City authorities restored the water supply.85 
According to the Court, the undisputed facts established clearly that the applicant was, 
prior to the dispossession, "in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the water 
                                        
81  Mushoriwa (page) 1. The judgment does not have numerically ordered paragraphs. 
82  Mushoriwa 1. 
83  Mushoriwa 2. 
84  Mushoriwa 2.  
85  Mushoriwa 2. 
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connection in dispute"; and that the only issue arising was whether such dispossession 
was lawful. According to the Court, there was "no substance in the [City's] claim that 
the applicant was no longer in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the water 
connection because of its threats to disconnect water to the premises", as that 
argument "goes against public policy that no one should benefit from his own 
inequity". Should that argument stand, said the Court, the City would stand to "benefit 
from its own wrongs or inequities should the threats turn out to be unjustified or 
baseless".86 
The dispute, said the Court, "has to do with their respective rights and obligations in 
respect of the provision of water to a citizen by a municipal authority", with it being 
agreed that the City has an obligation "to provide water and the applicant in turn is 
obliged to pay for it". The "point of departure", said the Court, is what happens "in 
the event that there is a dispute regarding payment", in which case is the City "entitled 
to self-help and to unilaterally cut off water supplies to a citizen without recourse to 
law?".87 In the Court's words, the City's argument was that statutory authority88 meant 
that it was "clothed with unfettered discretion to disconnect water supplies to a citizen 
at will without recourse to the courts of law".89 To this argument the applicant 
responded that the by-law was ultra vires when read, inter alia, with s 7790 of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe.91 The Court held that the effect of certain words in the 
legislation which the City relied upon92 was "to divest the [City] of the unfettered 
                                        
86  Mushoriwa 2. 
87  Mushoriwa 3. 
88  Section 8 of the City of Harare Water By-Law Statutory Instrument 164 of 1913, including that 
"[t]he council may, by giving 24 hours' notice, in writing without paying compensation and without 
prejudicing its rights to obtain payment for water supply to the consumer, discontinue supplies to 
the consumer".  
89  Mushoriwa 3. While it might seem startling at first glance to see that the authority relied on stems 
from 1913, this does appear to be a common problem in modern Zimbabwe. Many laws dating 
back to Rhodesia, especially in the areas of planning and land management, are being used by 
local authorities today. See, for instance, Ruwende 2014 http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/ 
news/zimsit_w_councils-still-to-amend-colonial-laws-the-herald/. 
90  Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act, 2013 is headed "Right to 
food and water", and reads: "Every person has the right to – (a) safe, clean and potable water; 
and (b) sufficient food; and the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
the limits of the resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right". 
91  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act, 2013 (Constitution of Zimbabwe). 
92  The third Schedule to the Urban Councils Act (Acts 21/1997, 3/2000, 22/2001, 13/2002) [Ch 
29:15], in terms of which municipal authorities are constituted. The Court pointed out that s 198(3) 
of the Act was to be subservient to the third Schedule to the Act, and that where the words "in 
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discretion upon which it seeks to rely on in justifying its unlawful conduct. Thus the 
[City] retained the words 'in the opinion of' in its by-law in order to unlawfully confer 
on itself a discretion not granted to it by the enabling parent Act".93 This is somewhat 
convoluted, but what it comes down to is that the Court found that the City of Harare 
had sought to use a by-law to keep a discretion which had in fact been removed from 
the statute in terms of which municipal authorities are constituted – and that doing so 
was unlawful. 
The Court then concluded, on this issue, that "when it comes to disconnection of water 
on account of failure to pay, the City Council's opinion does not matter. It can only 
disconnect water supplies on no less than 24 hours' notice upon proof that the 
consumer has failed to pay any charges which are due". As a consequence, the City 
"cannot lawfully disconnect water from a consumer unless it has established that the 
amount claimed is actually due", which raises the question of who is to determine 
whether the amount claimed is actually due or not.94 The Court then lambasted the 
City further, suggesting that what the City "seeks to do is to oust the jurisdiction of 
the courts so that it can operate as a loose cannon and a law unto itself", and that it 
"seeks to extort money from the applicant without the bother of establishing its claim 
through recognised judicial process", and that "[t]he disconnection of water supplies 
without recourse to the courts of law is meant to arm twist and beat the applicant into 
submission without the bother of proving its claim in a court of law".95 
The Court then iterated that the right to water "is a fundamental right enshrined in 
section 77 of the [C]onstitution of Zimbabwe"; and that s 4496 "imposes a duty on the 
State and all its institutions and agencies to respect fundamental human rights and 
freedoms". The City, said the Court, "being a public body and institution of local 
government, it follows that it cannot deny a citizen water without just cause" – and 
                                        
the opinion of the Council" appeared in the Act they were absent from the Schedule. This, said the 
Court, was clearly a deliberate omission.  
93  Mushoriwa 4. 
94  Mushoriwa 4. 
95  Mushoriwa 4. 
96  Section 44 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe reads: "The State and every person, including juristic 
persons, and every institution and agency of the government at every level must respect, protect 
and fulfil the rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter". 
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"it is trite that it is the function of the judiciary to interpret and enforce the law when 
a citizen complains that his human rights have been violated".97 
According to the Court, section 8 of the by-law98 "contradicts both the Constitution 
and the enabling statute in more respects than one" – firstly, because it authorises 
the City arbitrarily to "deprive citizens of their fundamental right to water without 
compensation";99 and secondly because it "unlawfully confers" the City with the "sole 
jurisdiction to arbitrarily determine the dispute without recourse to the courts of law", 
in the event of a disputed bill.100 The latter allows the City to "be the sole arbiter in its 
own case contrary to the well-established common law maxim that no one should be 
a judge in his own case".101 "It is a basic principle of our legal policy", the Court went 
on, "that law should serve the public interest" and, "as we have already seen, every 
person has a fundamental right to water". "It is therefore", the Court concluded, 
"clearly not in the public interest that a city council can deny its citizens water at will 
without recourse to the law and the courts".102 
The Court then added the words "I take comfort in that the Supreme Court of South 
Africa in a related case of [Strümpher] came to the same conclusion on facts that are 
on all fours with this case".103 Finally, the Court noted that "[t]hose in the corridors of 
power must not abuse their authority by usurping the functions of the courts to the 
detriment of innocent members of society as happened in this case".104 The Court 
ordered, pending determination of the matter,105 that the City immediately restore 
water to the applicant's premises; and that the City be interdicted from "interfering 
                                        
97  Mushoriwa 5. 
98  Section 8 of the City of Harare Water By-Law Statutory Instrument 164 of 1913. 
99  This being "contrary to s 85 of the Constitution which entitles an aggrieved person to appropriate 
compensation whenever his fundamental human rights have been violated". Mushoriwa 6. 
100  This being "contrary to the provisions of s 69 of the third Schedule to the Act, as read with s 
165(1)(c) of the Constitution". Mushoriwa 6. 
101  Mushoriwa 6. 
102  Mushoriwa 6. 
103  Mushoriwa 6. 
104  Mushoriwa 7. 
105  This presumably meaning that the question of whether the amount of US$ 1 700.00 or another 
amount was indeed owing or not – the Court not being seized with making this determination. 
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with the applicant's possession of the premises by interfering with or terminating water 
supply".106 
Of course, it might be objected that the references by the Court to the Constitution 
are obiter, given the Court's eventual finding on dispossession – but they go directly 
to the question of unlawfulness and make it clear that the Court considered 
unlawfulness to arise here not merely because of factual possession and 
dispossession. Rather, the unlawfulness arose from a combination of dispossession 
and breach of rights in respect of a very particular, and special, kind of property. 
5 Conclusion 
Although both judgments concerned the common law remedy of the mandament van 
spolie, a remedy in the sub-field of property law, and neither raised the Mazibuko 
case, what they arguably had in common was a concern to make the decision within 
the confines of the mandament van spolie while at the same time distinguishing 
between cases concerning "ordinary" property and water. 
The obvious and immediate objection which could be made to the arguments outlined 
in the present article is that as the two cases discussed concerned the application of 
the mandament van spolie they fall inherently to be decided on the basis of common 
law principles relating to dispossession and unlawfulness. What is being argued, 
however, is that although the cases did indeed concern the mandament van spolie, 
both of them were decided on a basis other than purely that of dispossession of 
ordinary property. 
In the Strümpher judgment the South African Supreme Court of Appeal made several 
allusions to water standing on a different footing legally to other forms of property. 
The Court indicated that the right to a water supply cannot be classified as "purely 
contractual", or be described as "merely personal rights arising from a contract", and 
that the right to a water supply has been subsumed into statutory rights. The Court 
indicated also that the "limitation or discontinuation" of water services must be "fair 
                                        
106  Mushoriwa 7. 
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and equitable". Further, the Court indicated that a case involving the disconnection of 
water had to be distinguished from cases concerning the disconnection of electricity 
or of bandwidth. 
In the Mushoriwa judgment, the Zimbabwean High Court implied clearly that its 
thinking was informed by the fact that the order it was being asked to make was "to 
avert a catastrophe as one cannot survive without water". The Court made it clear 
that the question to be answered was whether a municipality was entitled unilaterally 
to cut off supplies of water, as opposed to items of property or services in general – 
the implication being that the provision of water stands on a different basis in law 
from the provision of other services. The Court indicated that the right to water is a 
fundamental constitutional right held by all persons, which imposes a duty on the 
State and all its agencies and institutions. Finally, the Court considered the municipal 
legislation relied on by the respondent City to contravene the fundamental right to 
water. 
On the one hand, the Mushoriwa judgment carries less weight as a judgment of first 
instance than the Strümpher judgment, which was made at the highest level. 
However, the judgment in Mushoriwa in a sense carries more weight, as a judgment 
not constrained directly by the Constitutional Court precedent, which has been 
severely criticised. Of course, it must not be forgotten that in neither case was 
Mazibuko raised – the two cases involved the common law remedy of the mandament 
van spolie. In that sense the present argument is vulnerable to the charge that the 
writer is erring by conflating constitutional rights issues with the principles of common 
law. However, it seems to the present writer that both judgments saw a court called 
upon to decide a common law matter bringing into its judgment constitutional rights 
considerations, which indicate that the Court saw the subject matter of the dispute 
and the rights involved as being in some way different. In this regard the Zimbabwean 
High Court, while indicating "obeisance" to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Strümpher, was far less fettered than was the SCA in Strümpher – and was 
consequently able to go further in basing its judgment not just on common law 
principles but also on constitutional and human rights considerations. 
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There is an obvious difference between the two situations in that the Zimbabwean 
Constitution would seem to provide a stronger right than does the far more lauded 
South African Constitution – the Zimbabwean Constitution providing that "[e]very 
person has the right to – (a) safe, clean and potable water …";107 while the South 
African Constitution provides only for the "right to have access"108 to "sufficient food 
and water".109 Nevertheless it is instructive to consider the cases alongside each other. 
Although from different jurisdictions, the Zimbabwean law is considered to rest on the 
same basis as that in South Africa, Zimbabwean judgments have historically been 
reported in the South African law reports, there is much cross-referral,110 and – 
importantly – judgments in the two jurisdictions must be informed by the same 
background of environmental and socio-economic issues. Such issues will concern, 
amongst other things, extreme poverty, wide differences between rich and poor, poor 
service delivery from government, a lack of environmental security, and significant 
water shortages. 
In the Southern African context of grinding poverty, underdevelopment, governmental 
inefficiency, poor service delivery to the poor, and harsh environmental conditions – 
including gross environmental insecurity in respect of water and access to water – 
there will undoubtedly be many court cases to come, involving access to water. The 
South African Constitutional Court's judgment in the Mazibuko case has been widely 
and severely criticised, and may eventually come to be regarded as a retrogressive 
judgment. Until and unless it is overturned by the Constitutional Court, or by 
legislation, or through revised governmental policy,111 courts bound by the ruling can 
continue to find ways to develop the jurisprudence relating to environmental and 
particularly water security in South Africa by clarifying the legal relationship of people 
                                        
107  Section 77 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
108  Own emphasis. 
109  Section 27(1) of the Constitution. 
110  Note the references in Mushoriwa to the Strümpher judgment. 
111  With a considerable expansion of the amount of water available to the very poor, and improved 
delivery thereof. 
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with water112 – and in this regard South African courts could do worse than consider 
the Mushoriwa judgment of the Zimbabwean High Court.113 
It is not being argued that the mandament van spolie provides an alternative means 
to protect rights which were de-prioritised by the Constitutional Court in the Mazibuko 
case. What is being pointed out is that in the face of a ruling which has been roundly 
criticised, and which certainly appears to have under-recognised the limitations of the 
poorest members of Southern African society, litigants and the judiciary may well turn 
to common law remedies as a way to address issues of inequality until such time as 
the constitutional rights of the most vulnerable are better recognised. By treating 
questions of access to water differently from other property questions, courts deciding 
cases on the basis of common law remedies may eventually make a more valuable 
rights-based contribution to legal development than did the Constitutional Court in 
Mazibuko. 
  
                                        
112  In particular, by making it clear that water as property has a status different from that of "normal" 
property items; and that the fundamental right of access to water, again, makes it inequitable to 
treat water according to basic common law principles. 
113  Unfortunately, subsequent media reports have indicated that the Harare City Council has continued 
to cut off water supplies to payment defaulters – according to one report, to approximately 11 500 
defaulters between October and November 2014. Sunday Mail Reporter 2014 
http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/?p=19919. Also see Zimbabwe Today 2014 
http://www.zimbabwetoday.org/topics/service-delivery/water-sanitation/2014/10/18/5000-
water-bill-defaulters-cut-off/. Even more recent media reports do indicate, however, that the 
Mushoriwa judgment has been followed by a Magistrates' Court (per Magistrate Vimbai Mutukwa, 
in case 93/2015) in the city of Kwekwe in central Zimbabwe; with an order that the water 
connection of a resident, one Jackie Ngulube, be restored by the City Council (or, failing the 
Council, by the Messenger of the Court) after it had been disconnected by the City despite his 
claiming to be in good standing as far as payment went. The Zimbabwean 2015 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe-news/74635/city-of-kwekwe-ordered-by.html; 
and Mhlanga 2015 http://www.southerneye.co.zw/2015/01/26/court-orders-council-stop-
disconnections/. 
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